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Now, Moscow has taken aim at the only major international organisation with a solid track record in Georgia, the 56-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE has been in Georgia for more than 15 years: monitoring unstable areas in and around South Ossetia, promoting conflict resolution, supporting minority issues, helping lay the foundations for democracy and the rule of law, and criticizing electoral fraud. In South Ossetia it even facilitated economic rehabilitation projects between ethnic Georgians and Ossetians until the August war.
Last Month, OSCE member states met in Vienna to work on a Greek-sponsored compromise to keep the OSCE in Georgia, one of the final steps in thorny negotiations which have been going on since January. But Moscow shot down the Greek proposal, which had already been heavily amended to try to address Russian concerns, by preventing it from coming up for a vote.
There are several possible reasons why Russia wants the OSCE out of Georgia, one of the Organization's biggest and most important missions.
Moscow could be reluctant for the world to see what has gone on inside South Ossetia under its eight-month military "liberation" activities.
Russia's huge military might did not prevent South Ossetian militias from driving about 25,000 ethnic Georgians from their homes. In many cases local militias burned, looted, and even bulldozed villages as Russian troops stood by, in actions that Human Rights Watch has called "crimes against humanity" and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe termed "ethnic cleansing".
By closing the OSCE in Georgia, Russia also adds another front in its long-term diplomatic endeavour to undermine the efficiency of the OSCE as a whole. Since 1975, the Organization has helped promote European peace and security. But for years now, Moscow has been unhappy with the group's focus on human rights, media freedom and fair elections as the best way to encourage stability. Russia has used the political tools available to it as a member state to delay and obstruct the Organization's smooth functioning. Moscow has, for example, repeatedly delayed the passage of the OSCE's annual budget.
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GEORGIA: TBILISI BEING FORTIFIED FOR "POSSIBLE" MILITARY STRIKE -- REPORT
6/05/09
Defensive fortifications are being set up around Tbilisi in anticipation of a possible military strike on the Georgian capital, according to a Georgian media report.
Rezonansi, an opposition-minded daily, claimed that in addition to Tbilisi, fortifications are being built near the administrative border with the breakaway region of Abkhazia, where Russia has troops stationed. Defense Ministry officials were not available to confirm or to deny the June 4 report.
In interviews with the paper, independent military experts stated that defense measures are being taken to protect Tbilisi. "This step is correct and logical because occupying troops are stationed just a few kilometers away from the capital..."If you like this please Link Back to this article...
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"South Ossetia, isolated and with its "independence" unrecognized by the international community, is in crisis. This may explain the constant bellicose statements coming from Tskhinvali: renewed military confrontation may seem the only way to end the unacceptable status quo, established by the August 12 ceasefire.
The belligerence of the separatists is actively supported by Moscow, which has its own reasons to detest the status quo. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced, "Russia is concerned about Georgian troop concentrations near the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia" (RIA-Novosti, January 16). EU assurances that there is no "troop concentration" are not accepted. This week the Russian permanent representative in the OSCE, Anvar Azimov, announced, "The Georgians are concentrating troops and heavy weapons, building new bases and checkpoints." Azimov accused the EU observers of impotence and illegally trying to move their operations into Abkhazia and South Ossetia (RIA-Novosti, February 11).
The ceasefire last August has left the strategically important Russian base in Armenia cut off with no overland military transit connections. The number of Russian soldiers in Armenia is limited to some 4000, but during 2006 and 2007 large amounts of heavy weapons and supplies were moved in under an agreement with Tbilisi from bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki (Georgia). At present there are some 200 Russian tanks, over 300 combat armored vehicles, 250 heavy guns and lots of other military equipment in Armenia - enough to fully arm a battle force of over 20,000 (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, August 20, 2004). Forces in Armenia can be swiftly expanded by bringing in manpower by air transport from Russia. Spares to maintain the armaments may also be shipped in by air, but if a credible overland military transit link is not established within a year or two, there will be no possibility to either replace or modernize equipment. The forces will consequently degrade, undermining Russia's commitment to defend its ally Armenia and Moscow's ambition to reestablish its dominance in the South Caucasus.
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While snow covers the Caucasian mountain passes until May, a renewed war with Georgia is impossible. There is hope in Moscow that the Georgian opposition may still overthrow Mikheil Saakashvili's regime or that the Obama administration will somehow remove him. However, if by May, Saakashvili remains in power, a military push by Russia to oust him may be seriously contemplated. The constant ceasefire violations could escalate to involve Russian servicemen - constituting a public casus belli. The desire by the West to "reset" relations with Moscow, putting the Georgia issue aside, may be interpreted as a tacit recognition of Russia's right to use military force."
Read the full article at Jamestown Foundation.
Also read: Russia plans joint air-defense with Armenia (in German on RIA Novosti)
It's interesting to think further ahead. What if Georgia fell under the Kremlin's supremacy again? At least Abkhazia might very well try to gain true independence. (Remember the last elections, when Moscow's candidate was defeated?) For this case, they just established an air base in Abkhazia. The aim is not only to defend the Kremlin's interest in the South Caucasus region (mainly against Georgia), but also their stronghold in Abkhazia itself. This, too, explains why the Russian military has no interest in a peaceful settlement of the present conflicts around the two separatist regions of Georgia. Without the Abkhaz-Georgian antagonism, Sukhumi might rethink it's relationship with Moscow. (Among the population of Abkhazia, Russians are not as beloved as the official press tries to show us. Just think of the Olympic games at near-by Sotchi and astronomically rising real-estate prices in the northern cities of Abkhazia including Sukhumi and you get the picture.)
South-Ossetia, although poor, is still the biggest trump card in the hands of Putin and Medvedev. Firstly, because Russian tanks are stationed now only about 45 kilometers from Georgia's capital. Secondly, because South-Ossetia looks south to Georgia's weakest strategic point, that is the rather narrow East-West-connection (the "highway" running from Tbilisi to Batumi). Thirdly, continuing violations of the ceasefire-agreement create pressure on Saakashvili's government and an athmosphere of instability and unsureness, deterring investors and thwarting Georgia's ambitions on NATO-membership. And eventually, there is another option: By "proving" that an independent South-Ossetia could not defend itself against "aggressive" Georgia, it can graciously be admitted into the Russian Federation in a year or two.
The reference to Armenia and Russian troops stationed in Armenia might also give a clou to the (indirect) support of the Javakheti-movement of Armenians in Georgia, pressing for autonomy. Recent history has shown what "autonomy" for Georgia really means - the destruction of a multi-ethnic state, while on the other hand side the war against "bandits" and separatism in Chechnyia and elsewhere in the North Caucasus continues, accepted by the West as a "fight against terrorism" after 9/11.
What next will be accepted by the West, falsely assuming "common interests" with Putin and his camarilla?
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"We offer a unique blend of aggressive, unconventional thinking and tactics...We find opportunities where others see only disaster."
Indeed, that's true! ;-)
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During a news broadcast that began at 11 p.m., Georgia announced that Georgian villages were being shelled, and declared an operation “to restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia. The bombardment of Tskhinvali started soon after the broadcast.
According to the monitors, however, no shelling of Georgian villages could be heard in the hours before the Georgian bombardment. At least two of the four villages that Georgia has since said were under fire were near the observers’ office in Tskhinvali, and the monitors there likely would have heard artillery fire nearby."
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"The O.S.C.E. itself, while refusing to discuss its internal findings, stood by the accuracy of its work but urged caution in interpreting it too broadly. “We are confident that all O.S.C.E. observations are expert, accurate and unbiased,” Martha Freeman, a spokeswoman, said in an e-mail message. “However, monitoring activities in certain areas at certain times cannot be taken in isolation to provide a comprehensive account.”
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"I'm not pleased with how Europe has reacted," said Merab Saqvarelidze, 60, a doctor. Recalling Europe's appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s, he said, "Georgia doesn't need the same mistakes. Georgia needs, now, weapons and Stinger rockets. The Americans give Israel weapons and rockets, and for us they sent only candies and water" — a reference to humanitarian aid.
"And shampoo," said Giorgi Sikharulidze, 55.
In the crisp morning air, joggers bounced by and young mothers chatted over baby carriages. Cups of strong Turkish coffee were served. From the next table came the sound of dice hitting a backgammon board.
Whether the participants are talking about U.S. assistance or how ancient feasting traditions are being lost in Georgia's transition to capitalism, the style of these daily discussions is similar: Arms flail. Voices rise. Occasionally, the plastic table is pounded.
"Even when there are only four or five Georgians," Sikharulidze said, "they are arguing all the time."
Sometimes they argue with people who are not there. For example, with President Bush, over his September speech at the United Nations. "He should have been more critical," said Temo Gotsadze, 67, a bearded artist. "He did not defend Georgia as much as he should."
"Georgia is being punished," Saqvarelidze said, "because between two powerful countries, it chose America."
Should it have chosen Russia? The men shook their heads. No. Still, though, "We were expecting much more than just words," Sikharulidze said. "For example, as Russia has helped Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we expected the same from America."
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"The build up culminated with the amassing of 80,000 regular troops and paramilitaries close to the Georgian border, at least 60,000 of which participated in the August war," he explained.
"On 7 August it is estimated that 20,000 to 25,000 Ossetian and Russian troops and 240 tanks were in South Ossetia," he said, adding that the Georgian army has altogether 29,000 troops and 200 tanks, with the main part being stationed to the west facing Abkhazia.
"In the proximity of South Ossetia there were perhaps only 4,000 to 5,000 troops and 42 Georgian tanks," Mr Illarionov said, reminding that president Mikhail Saakashvili declared unilateral ceasefire on 7 August, only to see unprecedented shelling of the Georgian villages in South Ossetia that night.
"All of a sudden they understood that if the Ossetian-Russian troops move, it could be a matter of hours for them to get to Tbilisi."
President Saakashvili's decision to move against Tskhinvali "was self-defense, though it was quite a risky self defence," Mr Illarionov said.
"Saakashvili had received a very clear signal from the West - that America and Europe would not help. Even if the US would have decided to help, it was completely unrealistic, because it would have taken at least two weeks to deploy the very first troops. And it was very clear that 2 weeks was too late to defend Georgia. That is why he took this decision, clearly understanding that he would be left alone in front of Russia," he explained."
Read the full article on EUobserver.
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