If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
The August 2008 war with Russia exacerbated many existing problems in Georgia, perhaps most obviously whether Tbilisi’s priority should be the establishment of a strong state or one with democratic institutions. With Mikheil Saakashvili at the helm, this seems to be an either-or proposition. Although he is talented and well educated, Saakashvili is unwilling to allow the whole of Georgia’s political class to take part in the democratic process. He has suppressed dissent and made little effort to include members of the opposition in practical domestic and foreign-policy decisions, other than in a retouched manner for PR purposes—thus straying from the principles and values of democracy in favor of his own personal political ambitions and interests. And, of course, it seems that the Georgian opposition is disorganized and chaotic.
Few in the West, however, recognize Saakashvili’s true intentions. They either do not know or do not care much, being busy and over-burdened with their own complex and challenging problems. Though this regime is better than the last, there is a lot more talk of change and democratic politics than action. The current government has paid more attention to its international image than with reforming Georgian politics. With the help of foreign lobbyists, Saakashvili successfully created his own narrative about Georgia’s supposed respect for democratic institutions, one eagerly accepted by Western states. This narrative went over particularly well in the United States, where the Bush administration and, after that, presidential candidate John McCain offered steadfast support to Tbilisi. It seems the Obama administration’s position may be little different.
In Western capitals, Georgia was recognized as the “the beacon of democracy” and, to be fully sincere, the Revolutions of the Roses began that way. But this later didn’t reflect the realities on the ground. Georgia remained undemocratic and illiberal. The disconnect between Western perception and Georgian reality was no more evident than in the war with Russia. In the West, the conflict was seen through Saakashvili’s version of events, with Moscow as the aggressor, instead of the truer line of argument—that Saakashvili, being strongly provoked to do so by the Russians, got Georgia involved in the war in a vain attempt to integrate Tbilisi into the Euro-Atlantic community. That strategy did not work. America and Europe did not risk war with Moscow to bail out Georgia. And our problems cannot be solved through Western sympathy alone. So Georgia still remains defeated, dismembered and occupied country.
The way out of Georgia’s post-war crisis lies in ensuring the continued enfranchisement of all citizens of Georgians in the country’s political process. The government must search for compromises and maintain a political balance, since democracy is a constantly renewable contract resting on a country’s institutional systems and legitimacy. Free-and-fair elections, even ones recognized by the international community, are only the beginning of the process. Even undemocratic and illiberal countries are capable of holding fair elections that deserve the approval of both foreign observers and the wider international community. Georgia has been governed by illiberal methods, and the main administrative and financial resources of the country are often directed in the interests of one political clan. Real democratic systems require mutual responsibility between the ruling elite and its citizens, including first of all the opposition. A secure democracy is one that is governed according to its constitution and its laws. Only by striving to fully embody this democratic ideal will Georgia be able to cope with the problems it is facing.
Tbilisi must not look abroad for assistance with its political difficulties—and this includes in its troubles with Russia. The West will not go to war with Moscow over Georgia. The United States is beset with its own domestic and foreign-policy agendas and can ill afford to antagonize the Kremlin over a single Eastern European state. Europe, meanwhile, is beholden to Russian energy supplies and other business and trade interests. Moscow is well aware of the leverage it holds and uses its powerful commercial and political interests to its advantage. Georgia must be very careful not to make hasty decisions that would annoy Russia or anybody else in the world, as it will find little more than a sympathetic ear in the international community, as it belatedly realized in the aftermath of the conflict over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
So Georgia must first and foremost help itself. It must settle its own internal problems by ensuring its adherence to democratic governance. Georgians must learn from their past mistakes, and realize that Saakashvili’s obsession with his standing in Western capitals will get them nowhere. A commitment to real democratic reform that includes Georgians of all political stripes is the only way out of the country’s current post-war malaise.
Read the whole article at "National Interest online"If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
After a few kilometers, which you can still make with a normal car, you reach Okrakana. To go further, you need a good jeep.
Okrakana comprises just half a dozen houses. The valley becomes very narrow (follow the path to the left).
River Terek running through the gorge - the "middle section" of the valley
A wishing-tree. Georgians and Ossetians both pray to St. George.
a horse-rider of unknown origin passing by
After the gorge, the valley opens up again. Note the sedimentary rocks to the left.
Looking back in the direction of the gorge. Detail of sedimentary rocks. There are numerous springs with different waters; apparently, there is also a poisonous one on the other side of the Terek.
The high mountains to the left (SSW) mark, since 2008, the de-facto border to South-Ossetia.
Village of Kertisi. There are very few settlements in Trusso-valley. Many of the houses were in fact abandoned (in 2005).
| Unconstrained, Russia Eys More Georgian Territories | | |
| September 29, 2009 | |
| by Giorgi Kvelashvili |
Arguably, an occupation and annexation of the Truso Valley, let alone of the entire Kazbegi district, is more difficult to justify than the naval control of Georgia’s Abkhazia coast, but given the all-powerful “ethnic” and “humanitarian” nature of the “problem” – as portrayed by the Kremlin – in the Kazbegi district, it would not be impossible for the Russians “to come to the rescue of ethnic Ossetians” once again.
Russia is apparently creating advantageous international conditions to overthrow the pro-Western Saakashvili government in order to complete the process of Georgia’s disintegration."
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
...
Now, Moscow has taken aim at the only major international organisation with a solid track record in Georgia, the 56-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE has been in Georgia for more than 15 years: monitoring unstable areas in and around South Ossetia, promoting conflict resolution, supporting minority issues, helping lay the foundations for democracy and the rule of law, and criticizing electoral fraud. In South Ossetia it even facilitated economic rehabilitation projects between ethnic Georgians and Ossetians until the August war.
Last Month, OSCE member states met in Vienna to work on a Greek-sponsored compromise to keep the OSCE in Georgia, one of the final steps in thorny negotiations which have been going on since January. But Moscow shot down the Greek proposal, which had already been heavily amended to try to address Russian concerns, by preventing it from coming up for a vote.
There are several possible reasons why Russia wants the OSCE out of Georgia, one of the Organization's biggest and most important missions.
Moscow could be reluctant for the world to see what has gone on inside South Ossetia under its eight-month military "liberation" activities.
Russia's huge military might did not prevent South Ossetian militias from driving about 25,000 ethnic Georgians from their homes. In many cases local militias burned, looted, and even bulldozed villages as Russian troops stood by, in actions that Human Rights Watch has called "crimes against humanity" and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe termed "ethnic cleansing".
By closing the OSCE in Georgia, Russia also adds another front in its long-term diplomatic endeavour to undermine the efficiency of the OSCE as a whole. Since 1975, the Organization has helped promote European peace and security. But for years now, Moscow has been unhappy with the group's focus on human rights, media freedom and fair elections as the best way to encourage stability. Russia has used the political tools available to it as a member state to delay and obstruct the Organization's smooth functioning. Moscow has, for example, repeatedly delayed the passage of the OSCE's annual budget.
...If you like this please Link Back to this article...
GEORGIA: TBILISI BEING FORTIFIED FOR "POSSIBLE" MILITARY STRIKE -- REPORT
6/05/09
Defensive fortifications are being set up around Tbilisi in anticipation of a possible military strike on the Georgian capital, according to a Georgian media report.
Rezonansi, an opposition-minded daily, claimed that in addition to Tbilisi, fortifications are being built near the administrative border with the breakaway region of Abkhazia, where Russia has troops stationed. Defense Ministry officials were not available to confirm or to deny the June 4 report.
In interviews with the paper, independent military experts stated that defense measures are being taken to protect Tbilisi. "This step is correct and logical because occupying troops are stationed just a few kilometers away from the capital..."If you like this please Link Back to this article...
Poster on the way to Garni temple, national monument and important tourist attraction. The map is titled: Colchide, Iberie et albanie. Kolchis refers to the ancient name of West Georgia, known to the Greeks (Golden Vleece, Prometheus), Albania roughly to present Dagestan and Azerbaijan, Iberie to Armenia and most eastern parts of Georgia.If you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
...
"South Ossetia, isolated and with its "independence" unrecognized by the international community, is in crisis. This may explain the constant bellicose statements coming from Tskhinvali: renewed military confrontation may seem the only way to end the unacceptable status quo, established by the August 12 ceasefire.
The belligerence of the separatists is actively supported by Moscow, which has its own reasons to detest the status quo. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced, "Russia is concerned about Georgian troop concentrations near the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia" (RIA-Novosti, January 16). EU assurances that there is no "troop concentration" are not accepted. This week the Russian permanent representative in the OSCE, Anvar Azimov, announced, "The Georgians are concentrating troops and heavy weapons, building new bases and checkpoints." Azimov accused the EU observers of impotence and illegally trying to move their operations into Abkhazia and South Ossetia (RIA-Novosti, February 11).
The ceasefire last August has left the strategically important Russian base in Armenia cut off with no overland military transit connections. The number of Russian soldiers in Armenia is limited to some 4000, but during 2006 and 2007 large amounts of heavy weapons and supplies were moved in under an agreement with Tbilisi from bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki (Georgia). At present there are some 200 Russian tanks, over 300 combat armored vehicles, 250 heavy guns and lots of other military equipment in Armenia - enough to fully arm a battle force of over 20,000 (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, August 20, 2004). Forces in Armenia can be swiftly expanded by bringing in manpower by air transport from Russia. Spares to maintain the armaments may also be shipped in by air, but if a credible overland military transit link is not established within a year or two, there will be no possibility to either replace or modernize equipment. The forces will consequently degrade, undermining Russia's commitment to defend its ally Armenia and Moscow's ambition to reestablish its dominance in the South Caucasus.
...
While snow covers the Caucasian mountain passes until May, a renewed war with Georgia is impossible. There is hope in Moscow that the Georgian opposition may still overthrow Mikheil Saakashvili's regime or that the Obama administration will somehow remove him. However, if by May, Saakashvili remains in power, a military push by Russia to oust him may be seriously contemplated. The constant ceasefire violations could escalate to involve Russian servicemen - constituting a public casus belli. The desire by the West to "reset" relations with Moscow, putting the Georgia issue aside, may be interpreted as a tacit recognition of Russia's right to use military force."
Read the full article at Jamestown Foundation.
Also read: Russia plans joint air-defense with Armenia (in German on RIA Novosti)
It's interesting to think further ahead. What if Georgia fell under the Kremlin's supremacy again? At least Abkhazia might very well try to gain true independence. (Remember the last elections, when Moscow's candidate was defeated?) For this case, they just established an air base in Abkhazia. The aim is not only to defend the Kremlin's interest in the South Caucasus region (mainly against Georgia), but also their stronghold in Abkhazia itself. This, too, explains why the Russian military has no interest in a peaceful settlement of the present conflicts around the two separatist regions of Georgia. Without the Abkhaz-Georgian antagonism, Sukhumi might rethink it's relationship with Moscow. (Among the population of Abkhazia, Russians are not as beloved as the official press tries to show us. Just think of the Olympic games at near-by Sotchi and astronomically rising real-estate prices in the northern cities of Abkhazia including Sukhumi and you get the picture.)
South-Ossetia, although poor, is still the biggest trump card in the hands of Putin and Medvedev. Firstly, because Russian tanks are stationed now only about 45 kilometers from Georgia's capital. Secondly, because South-Ossetia looks south to Georgia's weakest strategic point, that is the rather narrow East-West-connection (the "highway" running from Tbilisi to Batumi). Thirdly, continuing violations of the ceasefire-agreement create pressure on Saakashvili's government and an athmosphere of instability and unsureness, deterring investors and thwarting Georgia's ambitions on NATO-membership. And eventually, there is another option: By "proving" that an independent South-Ossetia could not defend itself against "aggressive" Georgia, it can graciously be admitted into the Russian Federation in a year or two.
The reference to Armenia and Russian troops stationed in Armenia might also give a clou to the (indirect) support of the Javakheti-movement of Armenians in Georgia, pressing for autonomy. Recent history has shown what "autonomy" for Georgia really means - the destruction of a multi-ethnic state, while on the other hand side the war against "bandits" and separatism in Chechnyia and elsewhere in the North Caucasus continues, accepted by the West as a "fight against terrorism" after 9/11.
What next will be accepted by the West, falsely assuming "common interests" with Putin and his camarilla?
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
In the Soviet times, Gudauta -- Bombora -- air base could accommodate all types of military aircraft, including fighter jets, close air support and heavy military transport. The air base used to host a separate paratroops regiment and was among the first air bases to receive the Soviet Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jets (NATO designation Flanker). Sukhoi fighters also operated out of Bombora against Georgian attack aircraft and helicopters
in the 1992-1993 Georgian-Abkhaz war. At that time, the Russian military ran the base.
In 1999, acting upon Georgia's demands, Moscow committed to withdrawing from the Gudauta base. In 2001 it declared that it had done so -- a claim Tbilisi has contested continually. According to Gazeta.ru, the Abkhazian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indirectly confirmed the presence of Russian aircraft in Gudauta after the alleged withdrawal.
In the recent 2008 conflict, Russian airborne troops landed in Bombora to fight the Georgian army in western Georgia.
...With additional warships, fighter aircraft and military personnel near the Black Sea coast of Georgia, Russia is challenging the position of Washington, which recently signed a Strategic Partnership Charter with Tbilisi. In summer 2008, American warships were still able to enter the Georgian waters to deliver humanitarian aid for the war victims.
The United States supports Georgia's sovereignty and is interested in the security of strategic oil and gas transportation routes from the Caspian basin to the West, particularly the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
The new Russian naval and air bases in Abkhazia will change the geopolitical balance of power in the region. They will strengthen Moscow's military stance and make the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity an almost unrealistic project -- exactly what Moscow is trying to achieve.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian studies and international energy security at the Catherine and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute at The Heritage FoundationIf you like this please Link Back to this article...
During a news broadcast that began at 11 p.m., Georgia announced that Georgian villages were being shelled, and declared an operation “to restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia. The bombardment of Tskhinvali started soon after the broadcast.
According to the monitors, however, no shelling of Georgian villages could be heard in the hours before the Georgian bombardment. At least two of the four villages that Georgia has since said were under fire were near the observers’ office in Tskhinvali, and the monitors there likely would have heard artillery fire nearby."
...
"The O.S.C.E. itself, while refusing to discuss its internal findings, stood by the accuracy of its work but urged caution in interpreting it too broadly. “We are confident that all O.S.C.E. observations are expert, accurate and unbiased,” Martha Freeman, a spokeswoman, said in an e-mail message. “However, monitoring activities in certain areas at certain times cannot be taken in isolation to provide a comprehensive account.”
Read the full article: New York TimesIf you like this please Link Back to this article...
If you like this please Link Back to this article...
